| LEO Num | Topics | Summary | Date |
1119
 Print
|
| [WITHDRAWN 4/18] A lawyer acted properly in preparing a television commercial that used actual clients and properly described actual circumstances [explained in LEO 1750]. | 10/14/1988 |
1321
Print
|
| [WITHDRAWN 4/18] A lawyer's advertisements should: include only factual assertions and not opinions; be easily verifiable and not subject to ambiguous interpretations; and not convey the impression that the lawyer's skills rather than justice of the claim is determinative. [Overruled to the extent the conclusion is inconsistent with LEO 1750, as revised on 12/18/08.] | 2/27/1990 |
1297
Print
|
| [WITHDRAWN 4/18] Advertisement using statements such as "the best lawyers" may be inherently misleading. [Overruled to the extent the conclusion is inconsistent with LEO 1750, as revised on 12/18/08.] | 10/19/1989 |
1750
Print
|
| A compendium opinion on lawyer marketing reflects the 7/1/17 ethics rules changes. First, lawyers must disclose that their advertising includes actors rather than lawyers "when the language used implies otherwise" (as when actors "use first person references to themselves as lawyers"). Second, lawyers may use a phrase such as "no recovery, no fee" only when they have already decided that the "client's responsibility for advanced costs and expenses will be contingent on the outcome of the matter." Third, law firms may not include the name of a lawyer "not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm," and must "actually practice" under their advertised name. It is "potentially misleading" for lawyers to advertise "the use of a non-exclusive office space" if lawyers do not provide legal services there. Fourth, lawyers may not advertise that would-be clients "will have to consult an attorney" before speaking with an insurance company representative. Fifth, lawyers may advertise their participation in lawyer referral services, as long as the service is: "operated in the public interest; is open to all area lawyers who meet the services requirements; requires service members to pay malpractice insurance or otherwise ensure financial responsibility; has adopted procedures for admitting and removing lawyers; prohibits any fee-generated referral to any lawyers who have an ownership interest in the service. Among other things, such referral service membership advertising may not: falsely imply that membership is based on some objective "quality of services" assessment; state or imply that the services contain all eligible lawyers; falsely state or imply that a "substantial number" of lawyers participate in the service. Sixth, although advertising specific or cumulative case results no longer must be preceded by a specific disclaimer, such advertisements "can be misleading." For instance, it would be misleading to advertise a $1,000,000 verdict if the lawyer's client had turned down a $2,000,000 settlement offer before trial. Seventh, lawyers may not use such "extravagant or self-laudatory" advertisements such as "the best lawyers," "the most experienced," etc. Eighth, lawyers may not advertise or use client testimonials that cannot be "factually substantiated" – the same standard as the lawyers' own advertisements. Lawyers may use "soft endorsements" that describe lawyers' return of clients' phone calls, appearance of concern, etc. Ninth, lawyers may list their inclusion in publications such as The Best Lawyers In America, but if they are delisted they must accurately state the "year(s) or edition(s) in which the lawyer was listed." Tenth, lawyers may advertise as a "specialist" or "specializing in" certain areas, as long as they can establish its accuracy. Eleventh, lawyers may advertise using terms such as "expert" or "expertise" if they can factually substantiate the description. | 10/2/2019 |
1164
Print
|
| A law firm may join the list of firms to be recommended to members of a prepaid legal services plan as long as all advertisements are accurate. | 1/26/1989 |
0917
Print
|
| A law firm may not advertise that it has been in operation since 1882 when there was a gap in its operation from 1917 until 1925. | 6/11/1987 |
1277
Print
|
| A lawyer handling a foreclosure may advertise that the purchaser must pay legal fees for certain specified services. | 9/21/1989 |
0397
Print
|
| A lawyer may list former and present clients in an advertisement if the clients consent and may also refer to the lawyer's aviation law experience in the advertisements. | 11/13/1980 |
1052
Print
|
| A lawyer may prepare a display advertisement for a local grocery store that includes the lawyer's name, address, phone number and the four areas in which the lawyer practices. | 3/8/1988 |
0395
Print
|
| A lawyer may use the designation "LLM (Taxation)" in an advertisement. | 11/14/1980 |
1175
Print
|
| A lawyer referral service advertisement must clearly indicate whether it is for a law firm or a lawyer referral service. | 1/31/1989 |
1292
Print
|
| A lawyer who has lectured in a CLE program may advertise this fact as long as the advertisement is accurate and does not imply that the lawyer is a certified specialist. | 10/19/1989 |
0202
Print
|
| A lawyer who holds a JD degree may use the title "Doctor." | 11/13/1969 |
0211
Print
|
| A professional association may include a lawyer's name on the referral list its members use. | 8/19/1971 |
1405
Print
|
| A title insurance company owned by a lawyer and sharing office space with the lawyer's firm may not pay for the firm's salaries or advertisements. [This LEO was further explained in LEO 1564.] | 9/17/1991 |
1385
Print
|
| A Virginia lawyer who was also a member of the Florida Bar and a board certified tax lawyer in Florida may advertise this status in Virginia, as long as the advertisement specifies that the status was granted by a bar other than Virginia's. [Rule 7.4(d) would now require that the advertisement explain that Virginia has no procedure for approving certifying organizations.] | 11/30/1990 |
1229
Print
|
| An advertisement indicating that contingent fees in domestic cases are generally acceptable would be misleading, but the advertisement could indicate that a contingent fee may be possible if child support arrearages have been reduced to judgment. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 4/25/1989 |
1443
Print
|
| An advertisement stating that a law firm can "guarantee you get justice with the insurance company" is unethical. | 1/6/1992 |
ABA-457
Print
|
| In a general discussion of lawyer and law firm websites, the ABA explains that: (1) websites can include information about clients and matters, as long as the website keeps the information up to date (and thus is not misleading) and "as long as the clients or former clients give informed consent" to the inclusion of "[s]pecific information that identifies current or former clients or the scope of their matters"; (2) websites can include information about the law, as long as it is accurate, current and not misleading (acknowledging that it is difficult to draw the line between general legal information and specific legal advice, and suggesting that it would be "prudent" for websites to warn visitors "that the legal information provided is general and should not be relied on as legal advice" -- which "cannot be given without full consideration of all relevant information relating to the visitor's individual situation"); (3) websites allow lawyers to "control features and contents so as to invite, encourage, limit, or discourage the flow of information to and from website visitors" -- which will help determine if a visitor has initiated a "discussion" that could render the visitor a "prospective client" under Rule 1.18 (contrasting a website that encourages visitors to "submit a personal inquiry about a proposed representation" and a website that simply lists information about the lawyer and includes contact information, which "alone does not create a reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss a specific client lawyer relationship"; warning that "[i]mprecision in a website message and failure to include a clarifying disclaimer may result in a website visitor reasonably viewing the website communication itself as the first step in a discussion"; in analyzing the "significantly harmful" standard under Rule 1.18; explaining that a prospective client that discloses "only an intention to bring a particular lawsuit" normally will not be able to argue that such information could be "significantly harmful"; (4) a website's "[w]arnings or cautionary statements . . . can be designed to and may effectively limit, condition, or disclaim a lawyer's obligation to a website reader," as long as they are "reasonably understandable, properly placed, and not misleading." Among other things, such language "should be conspicuously placed to assure that the reader is likely to see it before proceeding." Such language can avoid misunderstandings about the creation of a client lawyer relationship, a visitor's expectation of confidentiality, the absence of "legal advice" on the website and whether "the lawyer will be prevented from representing an adverse party." | 8/5/2010 |
ABA-465
Print
|
| Lawyers may engage in "daily deal" marketing, but must comply with all of their Model Rules obligations, "including avoiding false or misleading statements and conflicts of interest, providing competent and diligent representation, and appropriately handling all money received." Under a "coupon deal" arrangement, a lawyer sells a coupon entitling the purchaser to a certain number of hours of legal service at a discounted rate. The marketing organization handling the arrangement collects purchasers' payments and forwards them to the lawyer, retaining a contractually-agreed upon percentage of the payments. The purchaser later directly pays the lawyer at the discounted rate when the lawyer provides the services. Under a "prepaid deal" arrangement, the purchaser pays the marketing organization the entire legal fee, and then receives services that would normally have cost more than that payment. Despite some state bars conclusion that such daily deal marketing are per se unethical, the ABA Model Rules do not automatically prohibit such daily deals if lawyers follow the Rules. First, payments to the marketing organization do not constitute unethical fee splitting. Instead, they essential constitute "payment for advertising and processing services." However, "one caveat is that the percentage retained by the marketing organization must be reasonable." Second, lawyers may not advertise daily deals in a false or misleading fashion. For instance, lawyers must "define the scope of services offered," and "explain under what circumstances the purchase price of a deal may be refunded, to whom, and what amount." Third, lawyers must explain that until the lawyer and the daily deal purchaser engage in a "consultation," no client-lawyer relationship exists. Lawyers must further warn anyone trading for, or receiving as a gift, any daily deal rights must carefully review all the terms and conditions. Fourth, before entering into a client-lawyer relationship, lawyers must assure that they are competent to undertake the representation, and warn any prospective clients if their matters will require more of the lawyers' time than the prospective client purchased under the daily deal. Lawyers must also assure that they do not accept so many daily deal clients that they cannot competently and diligently represent them all. Fifth, lawyers must properly handle any payments they receive from the marketing organization. Under a coupon deal, payments collected by the marketing organization and sent to lawyers are not legal fees -- and must be deposited into lawyers' operating account. Under a prepaid deal, payments lawyers receive from the marketing organization constitute "advance legal fees," and must be deposited into the lawyers' trust account. Lawyers must explain to anyone purchasing a prepaid deal what amount of the payment "is not a legal fee and will be retained by the marketing organization." Although it may be difficult, lawyers must also coordinate with marketing organizations to obtain required information about the purchasers whose funds the lawyers deposit into their trust account. Sixth, lawyers must properly handle money they have received in connection with purchasers who never use the lawyer's services. If a coupon purchaser never uses the lawyer's services, the lawyer may retain such payments (despite some state bars' disagreement) -- if the lawyer has "explained as part of the offer that the cost of the coupon will not be refunded." If a prepaid deal purchaser never uses the lawyer's services, the lawyer "likely" must refund any unearned advanced fees -- unless the prepaid offer was "for a simple service at a modest charge," in which case "it is possible no refund would be required, provided proper and full disclosure of a no-refund policy had been made." Seventh, lawyers must properly handle money they receive from daily deal purchasers whom the lawyer cannot represent because of a conflict or other "ethical impediment." In such a situation, lawyers must provide a full refund to the purchaser under either a coupon or a prepaid deal -- and cannot avoid this duty by disclosing otherwise in marketing materials. Because the lawyer is unable to undertake the representation "through no fault of the purchaser," the lawyer must refund all the money the purchaser has paid -- even if the lawyer cannot recoup the money retained by the marketing organization. | 10/21/2013 |
1872
Print
|
| Lawyers must be mindful of their confidentiality, supervision and marketing responsibilities, among other things, if they practice "virtually," or if they combine a virtual practice with an "executive office suite" for meetings and other activities requiring a physical office. Lawyers sharing a space with nonlawyers must take reasonable steps to protect client confidences. Lawyers must also take reasonable steps to protect their clients' confidential information when dealing with technology, including examining "the third party provider's use of technology and terms of service" before using such provider's cloud computing or other services (lawyers unable to assess these factors on their own "will have to consult with someone qualified to make that determination"). Lawyer might also have an obligation to explain to their clients the risk of using certain methods of communication and storage. A lawyer not physically present with colleagues and staff must nevertheless comply with the normal duties of supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers. Lawyers may not use misleading marketing by listing as an office a place where the lawyer does not actually practice (analyzing the situation using such factors as the frequency with which the lawyer uses the space, whether nonlawyers also use the space, signage, etc.). Under the current Virginia regulations (which are the subject of proposed amendments), lawyers admitted by motion to practice in Virginia must maintain an office where they can see clients (which does not include a "virtual office or shared occupancy arrangements." | 3/29/2013 |
1872
Print
|
| Lawyers relying on non-exclusive "executive office rental" space or similar space must: (1) "act competently to protect the confidentiality of clients' information"; (2) take reasonable steps to "supervise subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer assistants" that are not located with the lawyer; (3) avoid advertising such "non-exclusive office space or virtual law office" as "a location of the firm" unless it is an "office where the lawyer provides legal services." | 10/2/2019 |
Virginia-1885
Print
|
| Lawyers violate some ethics rules but not other ethics rules if they participate in a for-profit attorney-client matching service ("ACMS") under which the ACMS: advertises "without the lawyers input" fees for limited scope services to be provided by the lawyer; collects the fee, deposit it in the lawyers' operating account after the lawyer completes the work; withdraws a "marketing fee" which is set by the ACMS and based on the legal fee. Such an arrangement: (1) would violate the ethics rules governing limited scope representations, unless the lawyer and the client agree on the limitation rather than simply allowing the ACMS to define the scope in advance; (2) might involve an unreasonable fixed fee, unless the lawyer conducts "an independent assessment" of the advertised fee's relationship to the work; (3) would violate lawyers' ability to safeguard the unearned fixed fee; because the fee initially goes to the ACMS (a lay entity) and not to a trust account, and therefore could be vulnerable to the ACMS's creditors, cannot be refunded if that would be required, etc.; (4) would violate the fee-split rule because there is a "direct linkage" between the lawyer's fee and the ACMS's entitlement to compensation (in contrast to advertising fees which are not based on the legal fee amount); would violate the prohibition on lawyers giving lawyers or nonlawyers "anything of value" to recommend the lawyer (because the ACMS's marketing fee is not a legitimate advertising expense, but instead is "a sum tethered directly to her receipt, and the amount, of a legal fee paid by a client". | 11/8/2018 |
ABA-482
Print
|
| Lawyers who face or whose clients face the consequences of large-scale disasters such as hurricanes, floods, fires, etc.: (1) must comply with their communication duties, and therefore should maintain contact information for their clients and consider providing their own contact information to those clients; (2) if they continue to represent clients in the affected area, may be able to provide services outside their normal expertise, should evaluate in advance ways to assure that they will have the necessary client files and legal resources, keep track of litigation deadlines, take steps in advance to access trust funds and deal with affected financial institutions holding client or their own funds; (3) may have to withdraw from representations if they are unable to competently represent clients; (4) if they either permanently or temporarily re-locate to other jurisdictions, must comply with the multijurisdictional rules, other statutes and regulations of those jurisdictions; (5) must notify clients of the loss of "documents with intrinsic value" (such as executed wills, etc.), as well as other client or lawyer files that the lawyer cannot reconstruct after reasonable attempts to do so (to avoid such problems, lawyers should maintain copies of important documents in an off-site location," should consider returning all original documents and documents with intrinsic value created by the lawyer as a result of the representation to clients at the end of representation" and should also consider "including in fee agreements or engagement letters the understandings between the lawyer and the client about how the lawyer will handle documents once the representation has ended"); and (6) must avoid improper solicitation or other advertising in the wake of such disasters (remembering that they may solicit pro bono representations because those are not motivated by pecuniary gain). Out-of-state lawyers affected assisting clients in such affected areas must comply with the pertinent jurisdictions' multijurisdictional rules and other regulations. | 9/19/2018 |
1873
Print
|
| The hypothetical law firm of "Smith & Jones, P.C.," need not immediately stop using the Internet domain name and URL "smithjones.com" after Smith withdraws from the P.C. An immediate termination would not serve "the interests of the public" or "the partners in the former firm who collectively built goodwill and created value associated with that firm name." The "appropriate way of explaining why smithjones.com is no longer the Smith & Jones website" is to place a notice on that website. Although the P.C. owns the former domain name, it may not indicate on the website that the Smith & Jones "has now become" the "Jones Law Office," because that implies that Smith is no longer practicing law. Similarly, any redirection of visitors to the smithjones.com website to the "joneslawoffice.com" website also requires additional information. Such redirection is appropriate only if the joneslawoffice.com website, or a page visable during the process of redirecting, "explains the change from Smith & Jones to Jones Law Office and that Smith continues to practice law in a different firm." | 3/20/2014 |
ABA-419
Print
|
| This opinion withdraws the following ABA LEOs dealing with advertising and the use of credit cards to pay a lawyer’s bill: 320, 338, 1120, 1176. | 7/7/2000 |