| LEO Num | Topics | Summary | Date |
ABA-522
|
| (Although judges must disqualify themselves “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,“ judges’ failure to do so might trigger lawyers’ ethical duties as officers of the court to disclose information “that the lawyer knows is reasonably likely to give rise to a judicial disqualification obligation” - although that duty is subject to lawyers’ confidentiality duty to their clients. In their role as “officers of the court,“ lawyers may have disclosure duties about such issues as “unaddressed procedural deficiencies,” “controlling adverse legal authority under Rule 3.3(a)(2),” etc. (although that disclosure duty does not apply to information that “does not call the court jurisdiction into question“ or impact the “fair administration of justice“ – such as a statute of limitations defense that the adversary might assert an affirmative defense). Lawyers’ duty to disclose possible grounds for judicial disqualification could come from prior employment connections, campaign contributions, the judges’ family members’ involvement or relationships. Lawyers “must rectify” a “procedural deficiency” that goes to the “structural integrity of the proceeding.” Because lawyers must also comply with their duty to keep client confidences, such disclosures affecting judicial disqualification might implicate Rule 1.6’s duty to “comply with other law“ confidentiality exception, or Rule 3.3’s “fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding” confidentiality exception. Lawyers complying with their disclosure duty should provide the information “directly to the judge, with notice to opposing counsel”). | 4/8/2026 |
ABA-521
|
| (Judges’ obligation to comply with their ethical duties “extend well beyond their conduct on the bench” - to “embrace the full scope of judicial administration.” Those ethical requirements and the “appearance-of-impropriety test” apply to: (1) judges’ “administrative and supervisor roles,” such as a “pipeline program“ for judicial internships, which a judge should undertake using an “objective, merit-based and inclusive“ standard, rather than favoring students from the judge’s alma mater; (2) a judge’s reaction to learning that a neighbor is being criminally investigated, about which the judge should not contact officials, which “would appear[] to use the prestige of judicial office to influence an executive or law-enforcement process;” (3) staff appointments, which must be made “made impartially and on the basis of merit,” including: appointments such as “law clerks, courtroom deputies, administrative, assistants, interns, and other staff,” which must be “merit-based” and “unrelated to merits such as school affiliation, political affiliation, social ideology, or personal loyalty;” (4) appointing a son to represent indigent defendants, which is “ethically impermissible because it creates the appearance of impropriety and favoritism”; (5) appointing lawyers from an approved list to represent indigent defendants, which must be based on “objective professional criteria“ rather than their “political views” or alignment; (6) supervisory and oversight responsibilities over those serving under the judge’s supervision, which must involve “cultivating a professional environment in which impartiality, respect, and fairness are modeled and expected at every level of court operations,” including (for example) avoidance of “gendered or racialized nicknames,” jokes or comments even made in jest that make staff members “feel demeaned and uncomfortable”). | 2/18/2026 |
ABA-520
|
| (Under Rule 1.16 (d), lawyers have a “limited duty” in “limited situations” to provide former clients or their lawyers “certain information that is not already memorialized in the client’s file;“ ABA LEO 471 (2015) addressed the duty’s application to documents, and confirmed that the duty did not apply to material information or the lawyer’s errors discovered after the representation ended; as for information “not memorialized in the materials,” lawyers must disclose such unrecorded information if: (1) it is “necessary to protect the former client’s interests in the matter” and (2) it is “reasonably practicable to do so, “unless the information: (1) “is readily accessible elsewhere, or by other means;” (2) “concern[s] a different matter,” such as litigation following “a completed business transaction“ about which the former client seeks useful information; (3) involves the generation of “further work product;” (4) would require the lawyer to retrieve information not in the lawyer’s possession or otherwise known; (5) would obligate the lawyer “to perform further work, such as reviewing a court file, to refresh the lawyer’s recollection,” or “tak[ing] steps to acquire information, research and generate written responses;” (6) involves former clients’ “repetitive or excessively time – consuming requests;” or (7) would require the lawyer to “perform[ ] further legal services;” lawyers receiving requests from successor counsel must confirm the former client’s consent to the disclosure) | 1/21/2026 |
ABA-518
|
| ABA Model Rule 2.4 governs lawyers’ duties when acting as mediators, which such lawyers must clearly explain to the parties. As a neutral, such lawyers “should not state that the lawyer-mediator is acting to achieve a party’s best interest or that a proposed settlement is in a party’s best interest.” They may “provide legal information” and “offer an opinion as to how a tribunal is likely a rule on an issue,” but “should not state or imply that a settlement is in the party’s best interest because a tribunal is likely to decide adversely to the party.” As explained an ABA LEO 439 (4/12/06), under ABA Model Rule 4.1, “untrue statements [by lawyers representing negotiation parties] are not entirely forbidden.” But lawyer-mediators do “not have the same leeway.” For instance, they may not make a knowingly false statement that “this is the best offer the opposing party will make“ or “make misleading statements about the strength or weakness of a party’s case.” Similarly, lawyer-mediators may “accurately convey“ statements from a party’s lawyer permissible for those lawyers under ABA Model Rule 4.1 (because they “are not regarded as false statements of “‘material fact’“) – but such lawyer-mediators “may not give credence to those statements if the mediator knows them to be false” | 10/15/2025 |
ABA-517
|
| ABA Model Rule 8.4 (g), supplemented by cmt. [5], provides the ethics parallel to the Supreme Court’s prohibition on lawyers’ exercise of peremptory challenges based on prospective jurors’ “race or gender” -- while permitting such challenges based on their “age, marital status, disability, or socioeconomic status.” Cmt. [5] notes that a judge’s finding of improper discrimination does not automatically equate to an ethics violation, which requires a higher burden of proof. A lawyer acts unethically only if she “knows or reasonably should know“ that her challenge impermissibly discriminates. It is no defense that the lawyer acts at the client’s direction. But after an inquiry, a lawyer may rely on the client’s or a jury consultant’s suggestion -- if there are “sincere reasons that are legitimate” and not “ pretextual” or “impermissibly discriminatory.” Lawyers relying on AI to suggest challenges “should conduct sufficient due diligence to acquire a general understanding of the methodology.” While ABA LEO 493 (7/15/20) explained that unethical discrimination “extend[s] beyond unlawful discrimination,“ such “legitimate advocacy” as lawful but discriminatory peremptory challenges do not violate ABA Model Rule 8.4 (g). | 7/9/2025 |
ABA-519
|
| Because lawyers’ Rule 1.6 confidentiality duty applies “to the disclosure of confidential information to the court no less than to others” and there is no ABA Model Rule 1.6 exception that would allow such disclosure by lawyers seeking to terminate a representation in a matter before a court, such lawyers must address limits on disclosure of the termination’s justification. Courts’ handling this situation range from allowing extensive disclosure in open court to disclosure in camera or under seal to discipline for disclosure in withdrawal motions. ABA Model Rule 1.16 cmt [3] encourages courts to allow termination upon a bare-bones explanation “that professional considerations require termination.” Lawyers facing this dilemma may: (1) safely provide personal information, “not related to the representation” (such as the lawyer‘s physical or mental condition justifying termination); (2) secure the client’s informed consent to such disclosure; (3) rely on ABA Model Rule 1.6 (b)(6), which allows disclosure “to comply with other law or a court order;“ (4) occasionally rely on ABA Model Rules 3.3, 1.13 or 1.14 if those circumstances apply. In rare situations when a lawyer faces an insoluble dilemma because the ABA Model Rules prohibit continued representation but the confidentiality duty precludes an explanation, “the duty of confidentiality is paramount” - so such lawyers should not face discipline. Because the Rule “drafters … opted not to carve out an exception to the duty of confidentiality whenever lawyers seek court’s permission to withdraw,” lawyers should: (1) first make a “formulaic reference” to “professional considerations” or “irreconcilable differences;” (2) if that is unsuccessful, seek to persuade the court to allow termination without requiring disclosure of confidential information, (3) comply with any resulting court order by seeking to supply the information in camera or under seal; (4) provide the minimal amount of confidential information required. | 12/3/2025 |
1901
|
| While “time-based billing, such as hourly fees, can only be based on actual time spent on a task,” AI and “other technological tools that result in comparable productivity improvements“ implicate the “ethical parameters for non-hourly fee structures.” Rule 1.5(a)(1)’s reasonable fee standard includes consideration of both: “the time and labor required”; and (2) “the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.” Lawyer’s’ technical expertise and judgment about deploying AI and similar tools “represent valuable services for which the lawyer reasonably can be compensated,” and thus “support[ ] value-based billing models that focus on outcomes rather than inputs.” “It is not per se unreasonable for a lawyer to charge the same non- hourly fee for work done with the assistance of AI as work done without the use of AI.” As long as the lawyer explains the basis for a fixed fee,” “Rule 1.5 should not require the lawyer to surrender any benefit from the efficiency gains if clients continue to receive value from the lawyer’s output.”; Such a required explanation “could … be particularly important if the lawyer’s time spent on the specific representation is substantially reduced due to the productivity-enhancing tool, such that the client may need additional explanation of why the lawyer’s experience, technical skills, or other efficiencies contribute to the value of the services and determination of the fee.” | 11/24/2025 |