| LEO Num | Topics | Summary | Date |
ABA-392
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| A for-profit corporate employer may not share in fees generated by one of its in-house lawyers (above the level required to reimburse the corporation for any expenses incurred) and may not share in any court-ordered fees above the level required to reimburse the corporation. | 4/24/1995 |
0667
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| A lawyer may charge a contingent fee in collecting child support arrearages if the children are older, the arrangement would not hurt the children, the client is indigent and no other fee arrangement is practical. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 3/15/1985 |
0405
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| A lawyer may enter into a contingent fee arrangement to represent a wife seeking to obtain alimony arrearages if the wife is indigent and the amount of alimony had been fixed by a court order. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 4/6/1981 |
1174
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| A lawyer may handle litigation seeking child support arrearages on a contingent fee basis as long as the non-custodial parent is dead (and thus the case could not affect the human relationship between the children and that parent), the client cannot afford to pay an hourly fee and the fee is fair and reasonable. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 10/26/1988 |
1062
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| A lawyer may handle on a contingent basis a representation of a divorced husband in a matter relating to an asset that was not contemplated in the separation agreement because the husband could not afford to pay an hourly rate and no "human relationships" would be adversely effected (the parties were divorced and there were no children). [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 4/8/1988 |
0363
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| A lawyer may not accept a contingent fee in a representation to recover child support arrearages or determine future support rights. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 3/10/1980 |
0423
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| A lawyer may not enter into a contingent fee with a domestic relations client based on a percentage of the lump sum property settlement awarded by the court. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 8/14/1981 |
0778
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| A lawyer may not pursue a child support arrearage case on a contingent fee basis if the parent is not indigent. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 3/11/1986 |
1081
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| A lawyer may properly enter into a contingent fee arrangement with a client suing a father for child abuse, because the arrangement is unlikely to have an improper effect on "human relationships." [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 5/17/1988 |
0588
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| A lawyer may represent a client on a contingent fee basis in seeking child support arrearages as long as the client cannot afford a retainer fee and no other fee arrangement is practical. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 10/23/1984 |
0850
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| A lawyer may represent a divorced mother in seeking child support arrearages if: (1) the children have or will soon reach the age of maturity; (2) the lawyer determines that the contingent fee agreement would not undermine the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child; (3) the prospective client is indigent and no other fee arrangement is practical; and (4) the fee agreement is fair. The Bar determined that in the facts of this hypothetical such a contingent fee agreement was appropriate. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 11/10/1986 |
1298
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| A lawyer may represent a divorced wife on a contingent basis in seeking reclassification of marital assets, because the parties are already divorced (and thus the representation would not adversely affect any "human relationships") and the wife cannot afford to pay a regular hourly rate. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 10/25/1989 |
1653
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| A lawyer presented two hypotheticals in which a divorce client unable to pay a lawyer's bills might assign proceeds of the sale of the client's domicile. The Bar held that such arrangements improperly give the lawyer a proprietary interest in a cause of action and are barred unless: "the final order or decree has been entered, conclusively adjudicating all issues with respect to the use, possession, division and sale of such property;" the client consents after full disclosure; the transaction is fair and reasonable ("giving consideration to the client's sophistication, ability to pay, and feasibility of other methods of fee payment"); and the "client is advised that he or she may seek independent counsel to review the transaction and is afforded an opportunity to do so, if the client so elects." [Under Rule 1.8(a), a lawyer may not enter into a "business transaction" with a client unless the client is given an opportunity to seek independent advice, and there has been full disclosure and consent in writing.] | 9/21/1995 |
1652
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| A lawyer represented a client in contempt proceedings in which the client seeks arrearages from her ex-husband under a property settlement agreement. The ex-husband later hires the same lawyer to represent him on unrelated matters. Both the original client and the ex-husband sign waivers of conflicts. Five years later, the ex-husband hires the lawyer to represent him on criminal and traffic charges, and he and the original client again sign waiver forms. However, the ex-husband now objects to the lawyer's continued representation of the original client in seeking the arrearages.Because the lawyer's representation of the ex-husband ended in 1992, the ex-husband is a former client of the lawyer. A lawyer may be adverse to a former client unless the matters are the same or "substantially related" or unless the lawyer gained confidential information that can now be used against the former client. In discussing the "substantially related" standard, the Bar used the following terms: "involve either the same facts . . . the same parties . . . or the same subject matter;" "essentially the same, arise from substantially the same facts, or are by-products of the same transaction;" "entail virtually a congruence of issues or a patently clear relationship in subject matter." The Bar concluded that the lawyer's representation of the ex-husband is not "substantially related" to the lawyer's representation of the original client.The Bar could not determine if the lawyer would have learned pertinent confidences from the ex-husband, because the "ex-husband's earnings, employment, ability to earn, assets, use of earnings, lifestyle and life" could be material to the original client's contempt proceedings.The Bar acknowledged that both the original client and ex-husband had consented on two specific occasions to the simultaneous representations, but held that "it is doubtful that [the lawyer's] consent from ex-husband, as well as Client, cured [his] conflict of interest in his simultaneous representation of both." The Bar indicated that "in any event, consent is not a contractual obligation and a client under certain circumstances may withdraw the consent." The Bar held that the lawyer had "an incurable conflict" and must withdraw from the representation of the original client. [The Bar overruled as "overbroad" its initial Opinion that client consent may be withdrawn at any time.] | 7/8/1996 |
0568
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| Absent special circumstances, a lawyer may not represent a wife on a contingent fee basis in seeking her husband's military retirement pay. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 6/18/1984 |
1229
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| An advertisement indicating that contingent fees in domestic cases are generally acceptable would be misleading, but the advertisement could indicate that a contingent fee may be possible if child support arrearages have been reduced to judgment. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 4/25/1989 |
0189
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| Except in "extremely rare situations," lawyers may not enter into contingent fee arrangements in family law matters. [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] | 7/1/1984 |
1606
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| This LEO describes the principles governing attorney fees, emphasizing that fee contracts "are not construed as are other commercial contracts." Among other things, "all fees must be reasonable." Because the client "retains the absolute right to discharge the lawyer at any time for any reason or without reason," a discharged lawyer may only recover in quantum meruit for services rendered - valued by looking at the "reasonable value of the services rendered, not to the benefit received by the client." A lawyer must return all unearned fees if the representation ends. A "retainer" is not a pre-payment for legal services, but rather a payment made to insure a lawyer's availability for future legal services. There may be no non-refundable advance legal fee. Even if a lawyer and client agree to a fixed fee, the lawyer must return any unused portion if the representation ends (using a quantum meruit approach). Contingent fees can be used in family law matters only in "extremely rare situations." [Rule 1.5(d)(1) and Comment [3a] codify the circumstances in which lawyers may handle family law matters on a contingent fee basis.] [Approved by the Supreme Court of Virginia 11/2/16]. | 11/22/1994 |